Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), once a revolutionary militia born from the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has evolved into a formidable force shaping Iran’s regional and global influence. However, recent military setbacks following strikes by the U.S. and Israel have raised questions about the IRGC’s future and the implications for Iran’s regime and its foreign policy. Dr. Afshon Ostovar, an Iran expert and author of Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, explained how these losses have fundamentally challenged the IRGC’s once-unchallenged strategic goals of building a military deterrent, nuclear enrichment, and regional proxy expansions, which are now on shaky ground.
Founded to protect Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the IRGC initially derived its legitimacy from the overthrow of the Shah and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War. Over time, the IRGC’s power expanded through a narrative of an eternal struggle with the West, particularly the U.S. and Israel. But as Ostovar points out, this ideological framework no longer resonates with most Iranians, many of whom are now demanding better relations with the West and are weary of the regime’s isolationist policies. Despite these shifts in public sentiment, the IRGC continues to serve as a key pillar of the regime’s power, operating in close alignment with the country’s clerical elite.
Behnam Ben Taleblu, Senior Director of FDD’s Iran Program, emphasized that the IRGC was created in part due to mistrust in the traditional Iranian military, which remained loyal to the Shah. The IRGC’s growth was fueled by its role in enforcing revolutionary edicts and developing an ideological military force, a move that was rooted in the clerical leadership’s skepticism of the national army. This dual structure has allowed the IRGC to exert significant influence over both military and political affairs in Iran, making it a critical component of the regime’s strategy.
Over the past year, the IRGC has faced a series of strategic defeats, including the degradation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the crippling of Hamas in Gaza, the near loss of Syria, and the destruction of Iranian military infrastructure by U.S. and Israeli strikes. These losses, according to Ostovar, have effectively neutralized the IRGC’s regional influence and forced the regime to reconsider its approach to external conflicts. While the IRGC may attempt to rebuild its capabilities, the path to recovery is fraught with challenges, including sanctions, cyberattacks, and internal economic strains.
Despite these setbacks, experts suggest that the IRGC is unlikely to turn against the regime. Both Ostovar and Taleblu note that the IRGC’s loyalty to the clerical establishment remains strong, and without a shift in the status quo, the regime’s grip on power is expected to persist. Looking ahead, the IRGC is likely to focus more on domestic repression and seek to rebuild conventional military capabilities through alliances with countries like China and Russia. This shift may signal a more insular and autocratic Iran, reminiscent of North Korea, rather than the more expansive force it once was.
As the IRGC navigates this uncertain future, the potential for internal and external changes remains a subject of debate. While some reformist elements within the regime envision a path toward normalization and growth, the IRGC’s continued dominance suggests that Iran’s trajectory will remain complex and influenced by both its domestic dynamics and external pressures.