Israel is set to launch a major offensive in Gaza City, which is considered the defining battle of its conflict with Hamas. The operation, named Gideon’s Chariots B, involves the deployment of up to five IDF divisions and the mobilization of 60,000 reservists. This operation is expected to be one of the largest military actions in the region, with experts warning of significant civilian casualties and the complexity of clearing a densely populated urban area.
John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum, emphasized that the scale of the operation is unprecedented. ‘This will be a bigger challenge than anything the IDF has faced, arguably ever,’ he said. ‘It is the densest location in Gaza, the heart of Hamas’s stronghold. You don’t really know what the tunnels are until you get into them.’ The IDF plans to send more combat power into Gaza City than it has deployed across the entire Strip thus far. ‘If your goal is to clear Gaza City of Hamas’ military capabilities and search for hostages, you need that scale,’ Spencer noted.
Gadi Shamni, former commander of the Gaza Division, warned that the operation’s complexity is heightened by the nature of the urban environment. ‘It is a crowded city with refugee camps, dense neighborhoods, high-rises, and a highly developed underground. People say the IDF controls above and below ground, but in the last campaign we saw that wasn’t always true. Even when you destroy tunnels, Hamas can rebuild them quickly. The longer you stay with more forces, the more opportunities you create for the other side to attack,’ he said.
A former senior Israeli security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, highlighted the high cost of the operation. ‘The IDF can militarily conquer Gaza, but the costs will be immense on both sides. The IDF will fight with a method of ‘destroy everything first’—air force bombs, massive charges, detonating streets from afar, wiping out entire areas and advancing slowly,’ the official said. ‘The IDF has gained enormous experience over the past two years and will use those tactics in this battle. You are strong, the enemy is weak, and you have patience. Even the weather is on Israel’s side, with winter not arriving until January.’
Spencer also pointed out the challenges posed by Hamas’ underground tunnel network, which allows for the movement of fighters and the concealment of hostages. Unlike ISIS in Mosul, Hamas has developed an extensive system of tunnels, making the operation more complex. ‘They’ve learned so much. But this will still be slow, very careful and costly,’ Spencer said, drawing comparisons to the 2004 battle for Fallujah in Iraq, where the Marine Corps took about two weeks to clear the city of every home and building.
Shamni also warned about the potential for Hamas to relocate hostages into combat zones to deter strikes. ‘This tactic would be difficult for the IDF to engage without harming captives, presenting a conflict between military necessity and core values,’ he said. He also raised concerns about the evacuation of civilians, noting that ‘you don’t know who will leave, how many will leave, how they’ll react—or whether Hamas will even allow them to leave.’ Spencer estimated that around 10% of civilians might remain in the city, leading to a potential conflict between military action and the protection of noncombatants.
The former senior security official described the operation as ‘telescopic—very slow, with pistons working one by one.’ This method, while deliberate, also allows Hamas to attempt negotiations at every stage. The former official also warned that the dual goals of defeating Hamas and returning hostages are contradictory, risking prolonged conflict. ‘This could take months. Two months might seize the surface, but then you still have to clear tunnels. It will cost many lives—including civilians. The worst-case scenario is that no hostages are found alive or dead because of the destruction.’
Ultimately, Spencer concluded that the decision to press forward was a ‘calculated risk,’ acknowledging that while military action carries dangers, ‘you weigh the risk of Hamas killing the hostages against the certainty that they’re being starved and tortured. Military pressure is the last resort. Without conquering Gaza City, Hamas will continue to hold a sanctuary.’