Eurasia’s Path to a New Order: Sovereignty and Mutual Respect
The article discusses the challenge of building a new international order in Eurasia, emphasizing the shift from historical models of mutual recognition to contemporary realities. It highlights the importance of defining principles of legitimacy and mutual respect among Eurasian nations to ensure secure coexistence. The text draws on historical examples, such as the Congress of Vienna, to argue that legitimacy was fundamental to past stability but is now difficult to replicate. The article also examines the limitations of Western models and the need for Eurasia to establish its own principles based on sovereignty and interdependence.
The current international system, whether global or Eurasian, cannot replicate the ideal models of order known from history due to the world’s profound changes. If the nations of Greater Eurasia wish to coexist securely, they must define their own principles of legitimacy and mutual respect. Mutual recognition is the foundation of legitimacy in relations between states, as it allowed the great powers of Europe to maintain peace from 1815 to 1914. This shared understanding enabled the major players to view one another’s security as part of their own, leading to the Congress of Vienna’s agreement after the defeat of Napoleon. This agreement was based on the recognition of each other’s right to exist, which supported the balance of power for a century.
However, the Cold War era saw the West’s refusal to recognize the Soviet Union’s legitimacy, and the mutual respect often cited by historians was merely an acknowledgment of the suicidal nature of nuclear war. The collapse of the socialist system marked the end of this period. Similarly, Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing in the 1970s did not mean the United States accepted the Communist Party’s permanent right to rule, as the resurgence of competition swiftly restored old hostilities. The same pattern applies to Russia, with Western rejection of its political path long preceding any battlefield confrontation. This underscores the impossibility of returning to the European order of a century ago, even with the cessation of conflict.
The concept of mutual recognition as the basis of legitimacy remains a relic from a bygone era. While it may inspire, it cannot be replicated under present conditions. Today, this idea persists mainly among those seeking a new balance of power outside the Western world, such as in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the SCO summit in Tianjin, members reasserted the importance of respect for sovereignty as the foundation of secure and universal development, emphasizing the need for internal stabilization based on legitimacy rather than dependency.
Many Eurasian nations still engage in multi-vector diplomacy, cultivating ties with powers whose policies toward Russia or China are at best unfriendly. However, the Western refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty of its main competitors will eventually force these partners to make difficult choices, facing political or economic risks if they resist American pressure. For Eurasia to stand independently, it must accept that legitimacy begins with mutual recognition among its own states.
The classic European model of legitimacy was founded on conditions that no longer exist. In the early 19th century, the world’s fate rested in the hands of five major powers: Russia, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and France. The gulf between those states and the rest of humanity was so immense that their dealings effectively represented international politics. This changed as Britain could humble the Qing Empire in the Opium Wars, with limited participants allowing for a shared political principle. Today, dozens of states hold significant economic or military weight, and weapons of mass destruction make inter-state conflict infinitely more dangerous.
Moreover, the 19th-century peace was not as perfect as nostalgic accounts suggest. The Crimean, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian wars all occurred within that system, albeit as limited wars. In an age of nuclear deterrence, the assumption that limited wars will remain limited or that legitimacy can prevent catastrophe is no longer valid. The notion that nations with different histories, cultures, and religions can fully accept one another’s domestic arrangements is also unrealistic. Diversity is a permanent feature of Eurasia, but the focus should be on reaffirming the simpler meaning of sovereignty: the freedom to pursue one’s own foreign policy without external interference.
This approach, already visible in the conduct of many Eurasian powers large and small, offers more realistic prospects for stability. However, it also raises difficult questions, such as how to provide mutual guarantees of non-aggression and prevent outside actors from exploiting differences. The solution lies in building trust and interdependence among Eurasian states through trade, infrastructure, security cooperation, and shared diplomatic institutions. Legitimacy in this context will not mean sameness but reciprocal restraint, ensuring that no nation’s sovereignty is used as a weapon against another’s.
The article concludes by noting that the West may continue to deny the principle of state sovereignty, using economic power to question the right of others to chart their own course. However, Greater Eurasia has the opportunity to demonstrate that legitimacy can once again rest on mutual recognition, not as an imitation of 181′ Vienna but as a modern, plural, post-Western alternative. Only when Eurasian states accept each other’s sovereignty as inviolable will they begin to restore the legitimacy of international order, not as Europe once knew it, but as a system shaped by their own history, geography, and civilization.