China’s history of stealing F-35 technology raises security concerns as military experts debate potential Saudi Arabia military sales and national security risks. The United States has already rejected the United Arab Emirates and Turkey due to concerns over Chinese technology exploitation. Retired Gen. Charles Wald, a former U.S. Air Force officer and deputy commander of EUCOM, stated that the U.S. has already denied the UAE and Turkey the F-35 due to the risk of technology transfer to China. Wald emphasized that while Saudi Arabia may not be the primary source of leaks, the Chinese could exploit the technology through intelligence methods. This issue is part of a larger debate on the implications of foreign military sales and the risks involved in sharing advanced defense technology.
Gordon Chang, a China expert, argues that Beijing has already demonstrated its ability to penetrate U.S. defense programs and should be assumed to be targeting the F-35 again. Chang suggests that Washington must balance the risks with the strategic benefits of strengthening ties with Riyadh. He advises that the U.S. should consider allowing Saudi Arabia to have stripped-down F-35s to cement the relationship with the crown prince. Chang further warns that other U.S. partners, such as South Korea, may present even greater concerns regarding technology transfer to China.
Chinese intelligence services have been implicated for years in efforts to harvest American military and aerospace technology, including stealth designs, propulsion systems, and advanced avionics. U.S. officials have previously linked Chinese cyber actors to thefts targeting premier American defense programs, including components resembling those found in fifth-generation fighters. Against this backdrop, the United States is weighing whether to approve Saudi Arabia’s request for the F-35 as part of a broader negotiation that includes defense assurances and potential diplomatic progress with Israel.
Retired Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, noted that the U.S. uses foreign military sales monitoring protocols to reduce risk, but the protections are not perfect. Ashley explained that end-use case monitoring is a part of the process, but it cannot guarantee complete security. Despite the China threat, retired commanders stated that they do not believe a Saudi F-35 acquisition would undermine Israel’s qualitative military edge. Wald emphasized that Israeli pilots, planners, and engineers maintain a superior level of training and innovation, allowing Israel to integrate its own upgrades into the aircraft. He added that even if approved, Riyadh would not receive the aircraft for years, with a minimum five-year window before delivery.
Ashley and Wald suggested that in the long term, additional F-35s in the region could enhance shared situational awareness and strengthen collective defenses against Iran. Retired Vice Adm. Mark Fox noted that the F-35’s data-sharing architecture means more aircraft in allied hands improves overall performance. Fox highlighted that having more F-35s in the region increases the coalition’s capability, making the aircraft a critical asset in maintaining regional security and defense coordination.