G7 Political Systems Under Crisis as France, Japan, and Others Face Instability
France is once again in crisis. President Emmanuel Macron’s government failed to win a vote of confidence in the National Assembly, leading to its resignation. Macron has promised to propose a new candidate quickly, but the situation is not as straightforward as it seems. He had already called for early elections last spring, resulting in a parliament with no stable majority. Now, he must try to form a cabinet for the third time in less than a year. If he fails, new elections will follow, and this time even his usual strategies may not be enough. Both the far right and the far left have been waiting for this moment, with their political forces sharpening their positions for the embattled president for years.
The turmoil in Paris is far from unique, as it is part of a wider malaise across the political systems of the G7. In Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba long resisted the call to resign, but his party’s losses in two parliamentary elections left him with no choice. Britain is also in turmoil, with a scandal forcing the resignation of the deputy prime minister and leaving the Labour Party floundering. Nigel Farage’s Reform Party now leads in the polls, while Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz records record-low ratings, despite the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany remaining stable at CDU levels.
Italy and Canada are relatively stable, though only barely. Canada’s Liberals were rescued not by their own strength but by Donald Trump’s attacks on Ottawa, providing a rally-round-the-flag effect that spared them from a near-certain defeat. The result was continuity in power, though with Mark Carney replacing Justin Trudeau. In the United States, the picture is clear: Trump’s supporters face little resistance, and his opponents are simply waiting for better times.
Each of these cases has local causes, yet together they reveal something larger. For countries with deep democratic traditions, turmoil is not new. However, the simultaneity of today’s upheavals makes this moment extraordinary. The world is in open unrest, and no major power is insulated. The question is not whether the turbulence will continue, but how well political systems can withstand the waves.
The article highlights a crucial difference between the United States and its allies, on one hand, and the European Union on the other. The US, Canada, Britain, and Japan remain sovereign states, with their governments retaining legitimacy and the ability to act quickly when circumstances demand it. These decisions, while possibly good or bad, are at least the product of their own political processes. In contrast, the EU’s situation is different, as their sovereignty is deliberately limited by the framework of European integration. In the second half of the 20th century, this integration was a major strength, allowing members to gain leverage they could never have achieved alone. However, the same structure now acts as a brake, especially in a world where speed of decision is vital. Brussels makes it harder, not easier, to act quickly.
Additionally, economic interdependence and ideological constraints ensure that problems go unsolved and reinforce each other. Worse, there is no vision of how the system might change under current institutional rules. As a result, rather than rethinking the course, leaders try to bulldoze through with even more energy. Opposition forces are excluded even when they win elections. And the Ukrainian issue has been turned into the central pillar of EU politics. Should that issue fade, a mass of uncomfortable domestic questions will come to the surface, and Western Europe’s rulers know it.
Manipulation and muddling through remain possible for France and Germany, but each time, it becomes harder, and the gap between society’s demands and the establishment’s interests grows wider. This is why the “moment of truth” for EU politics is approaching. No one can predict what follows. The bloc will not return to the pre-integration era, but the political forces cast as outsiders today may soon be the ones defining the new order.
What we are witnessing is not just a crisis in France, or a resignation in Japan, or a reshuffle in Italy. It is a collective crisis of the G7’s political systems. The American-led bloc still has reserves of strength, particularly its sovereign states, which can still change course when pressed. However, the EU, bound by its own rigidities, finds itself caught. Its governments cannot adapt quickly, and its supranational institutions block meaningful change. The European project was once the most successful political innovation of the Old World, but it has grown stale. The EU’s cumbersome structure is no longer a solution but part of the problem. At a time when the world is shifting fast, the Union is locked into yesterday’s procedures.
This leaves Western Europe with a stark choice. Either it finds a way to reform—reconciling sovereignty with integration, flexibility with cooperation—or it will continue to stumble forward, ever more divorced from the societies it claims to represent. In that widening gap lies the real danger. For now, its leaders may suppress alternatives and manage through manipulation. But the longer they do, the greater the eventual reckoning. And when it comes, EU politics won’t be the same again.
This article was first published in the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and was translated and edited by the RT team